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1 Introduction
The eﬀect of ﬁscal variables on bond markets is hotly debated. A topic of particular
importance concerns the question, whether and to what extent bond markets price in
the possibility of (partial) sovereign default by demanding higher interest rates. If a
worsening in the ﬁscal position of an issuer country increases the default probability,
it should also be reﬂected in an increase of the default risk premium contained in
bond yields, measurable by an increase in the interest rate spread towards a low risk
benchmark country.
In the previous literature, ﬁscal determinants of sovereign default risk are quan-
tiﬁed by the oﬃcial ﬁscal position of a country, usually the oﬃcial debt and deﬁcit
ﬁgures. The general empirical ﬁnding is that bond yields depend positively on the
debt and deﬁcit level (Capeci (1991, 1994), Alesina, De Broeck, Prati, and Tabellini
(1992), Bernoth, von Hagen, and Schuknecht (2004)). No empirical study so far in-
vestigates, whether ﬁnancial markets are ”fooled” by governments if these misreport
on their true state of ﬁscal policy. This is the main purpose of our paper.
Oﬃcial reported ﬁscal variables might not give an accurate picture of the true
ﬁscal position of a country for many reasons. Politicians might want to hide deﬁcits if
voters dislike them.1 Governments might also want to engage in additional spending
without having parliamentary approval. Parliamentary control can be reduced by
ﬁscal misreporting.2 Moreover, ﬁscal rules such as constitutional deﬁcit limits and
international rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) constitute limits on
oﬃcial ﬁscal data and therefore on ﬁscal behavior. This might increase the incentive
of governments to hide away deﬁcits by reverting to window-dressing or shifting ﬁscal
expenditures oﬀ the budget (Milesi-Ferretti 2003). We label these activities ’creative
accounting’. Especially the use of creative accounting to ’comply’ with the European
ﬁscal rules, namely the excessive deﬁcit procedure (EDP) and the SGP, has recently
1Alt and Lassen (2006) provide evidence that electoral cycles depend on ﬁscal transparency.
They are less pronounced, the more ﬁscally transparent a country is. von Hagen and Wolﬀ (2006)
show that creative accounting moves with the business cycle.
2This is the idea behind the sub-index on ﬁscal transparency developed in von Hagen (1992).
3become an important policy concern in Europe (see e.g. European Commission,
2003).
Numerous studies investigate the eﬀect of ﬁscal rules on budget outcomes for
US states and cities (Bunch (1991), von Hagen (1991), Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996),
Bohn and Inman (1996)). The general conclusion from this literature is that binding
restraints induce ﬁscal actors to use other instruments such as creative accounting to
dampen the eﬀect of the rule. Relatively few studies investigate the use of ”creative”
accounting in the EU.3 von Hagen and Wolﬀ (2006) are the ﬁrst to analyze account-
ing tricks in order to comply with the rules of the SGP. They focus on stock-ﬂow
adjustments (SFA), which are deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the reported annual
change in debt levels and the reported deﬁcits. Positive SFA imply that the debt
level increases faster than the deﬁcit data suggest. In particular, they ﬁnd evidence
that SFA was systematically used to reduce the oﬃcial deﬁcit ﬁgures. Koen and van
den Noord (2005) collect information on single one-oﬀ measures (ﬁscal gimmickry)
and show that the probability to observe such measures increases with the budget
deﬁcit. The empirical evidence thus conﬁrms the view that ﬁscal policy ﬁgures are
sometimes purposely changed to oﬃcially comply with ﬁscal rules. Signiﬁcant use
of one-oﬀ measures can be detected in Europe.
The reaction of ﬁnancial markets to this creative accounting is an important
policy topic. If ﬁnancial markets do not price in the de facto deterioration of the ﬁscal
position due to creative accounting, while punishing oﬃcial deﬁcit data, risk premia
could be lowered by shifting deﬁcits to creative accounting. The lower interest rate
in turn would provide an incentive to governments to beautify their ﬁscal data. To
our knowledge, no study so far analyzes whether ﬁnancial markets take note of ﬁscal
window-dressing when pricing government bonds. This is the purpose of our study.
In particular, we study whether spreads react, besides oﬃcial ﬁscal data, to stock-
ﬂow adjustments or to an alternative measure of creative accounting by Koen and
van den Noord (2005).
Furthermore, we investigate, in how far ﬁscal transparency aﬀects risk spreads.
Kopits and Craig (1998) argue that international ﬁnancial markets are likely to
demand lower premia from governments that are forthcoming about their ﬁscal
position and risk. The argument is that markets can be more certain about a
3Daﬄon and Rossi (1999) surveys the accounting tricks used in the run-up to the Euro. They
ﬁnd that numerous countries have used tricks to qualify for EMU membership. Similarly, Milesi-
Ferretti and Moriyama (2004) ﬁnd that during the period leading up to 1997 governments reduced
the public debt ratio by decumulating government assets in order to qualify for EU membership.
4ﬁscally transparent government’s ability and willingness to service its obligation.
A more transparent budget process in addition helps ﬁnancial markets to detect
creative accounting more easily and to assess the true ﬁscal position of a country.
This might increase the spread since more creative accounting becomes known to
the markets. Glennerster and Shin (2006) ﬁnd that the release of macroeconomic
information in the form of publication of the IMF article IV consultation reduces
spreads. Their measure does not cover ﬁscal transparency, however. Gelos and
Wei (2005) lend further support to the hypothesis of a risk-reducing role of ﬁscal
transparency by showing that international funds prefer to hold more assets in more
transparent countries.
These questions are addressed in the framework of Bernoth et al. (2004). In this
paper, the authors derive a simple portfolio model, which shows that the yield spread
between a risky and a risk-free country is explained by a default risk premium, a
liquidity risk premium, and an uncertainty premium. In their empirical part, they
make use of an innovative data set, which consists of spreads between Deutsche
Mark (Euro after 1999) and US$ denominated bond issues of 14 EU governments
and Germany or the US government respectively. They show that the interest
diﬀerentials between sovereign bonds increase with the oﬃcial ﬁgures of the debt
and deﬁcit to GDP ratios. In this paper, we modify the basic portfolio model
by diﬀerentiating between the true ﬁscal position and the oﬃcial ﬁscal position.
The default probability assessed by ﬁnancial markets might diﬀer from the true
default probability to the extent that creative accounting exists and is unknown.
Transparency by itself reduces uncertainty about the degree of cheating and therefore
reduces risk premia.
The next section outlines the model and derives the principle hypotheses. We
then present the empirical approach and discuss the data. Section 3 develops the
measures of creative accounting and transparency. Section 4 presents and discusses
the econometric results while the last section concludes.
2 Risk premia in government bond markets
2.1 A portfolio model of interest rate diﬀerentials
The theoretical model to analyze the impact of creative accounting on bond yield
spreads between two countries is an extension of the portfolio model of interest
5diﬀerentials described in Bernoth, von Hagen, and Schuknecht (2004). We modify
this model by assuming that governments might use creative accounting, which
makes the actual ﬁscal position of a country diﬃcult to observe.
Consider a representative international investor maximizing a utility function
that depends positively on expected real wealth, Et[wt+1] and negatively on its
variance, V art[wt+1]:
Max U {Et [wt+1],V art [wt+1]}, U1 > 0,U2 < 0. (1)
The investor allocates a fraction θt of his real wealth wt to a risky security of country
A and a fraction of 1 − θt to a safe security of country B. Both securities and real
wealth are priced in the same currency.
For simplicity, we assume that the invested money in A’s bonds is lost in case of
government default.4 Investors incur transaction costs proportional to their invest-
ment in bonds which decrease with the liquidity of the bond market. We assume
that the bond of country B has benchmark status, i.e., its market is considered to
be more liquid than the bond market of country A. Expected wealth then is:
Et(wt+1) = wt(1 − θt)(1 + r
B
t ) − θtwtl
A + θtwt(1 + r
A




t is the expected transaction/liquidity cost on trading a bond of country
A and ri
t denotes the interest rate on the bond of country i, with i ∈ A,B.5 P e
t
denotes the investor’s expected default probability, which depends positively on the
expected ﬁscal position of the risky country. Its determinants will be discussed later
in this section.
Due to the uncertain investment return of securities of country A, the variance
of next period’s real wealth of the investor is non-zero and given by:












Note, that there is no uncertainty regarding the transaction costs in the B market,
nor regarding the interest rate on the two diﬀerent bonds.
Following Dumas (1994), we substitute equation (2) and (3) into the utility
function and derive the optimal share invested in the securities of country A, and
4As shown in Bernoth et al. (2004), this model can easily be extended to the more general case
of partial default, i.e. that investors receive a fraction of their gross payment in case of default.
5Note that we normalize the transaction cost of the risk free bond market to zero.
6get b θt, the optimal share of investment in country A, by utility maximization with
respect to θt:
b θt =
(1 − P e
t )(1 + rA
t ) − lA
t − (1 + rB
t )
Φ(1 + rA




where Φ = −2wtU2/U1 denotes the coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion for the rep-
resentative investor.
Let SA be the total supply of bonds issued by the government of country A.
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In what follows, by the interest rate spread or diﬀerential, we mean the term on the
left hand side of the equation.
Equation (6) separates the yield spread between the two bonds into three terms.
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side reﬂects the default risk premium. The larger the
expected default probability, the larger will be the spread. Second, the bond yield
diﬀerential depends on the liquidity risk premium. The more liquid a bond market,
which means low transaction costs lA, the smaller will be the liquidity risk premium.
The last uncertainty premium depends positively on the variance of the perceived
default probability of country A, (1 − P e
t )P e
t . This variance increases with the
expected default probability if the expected default probability is smaller 0.5. The
last term also increases with the gross nominal return (1+rA
t ), and the level of the
relative risk aversion of the representative investor Φ. The more the investor cares
about the variance of his future wealth wt+1 (the larger U2), the larger will be the
interest rate diﬀerential between the risky and the risk-free country. Furthermore,
the country speciﬁc risk premium increases with the total supply of the risky bonds,
SA.
In the following, we discuss in more detail the determinants of the expected
default probability, P e
t . As pointed out, the spread unambiguously increases with the
expected default probability. Transparency and creative accounting enters the model
by inﬂuencing the expected default probability. We assume that one determinant
of the expected default probability is the degree of ﬁscal transparency. A more
7transparent budget process helps ﬁnancial markets to detect creative accounting and
signals the willingness and ability of governments to serve its obligation. Therefore,
we expect that ﬁscal transparency itself has a negative impact on the expected
government’s default probability and therefore also on risk premia. This argument
ﬁnds support in e.g. Kopits and Craig (1998) and Glennerster and Shin (2006).
A further important determinant of the expected default probability, P e
t , is the
expected ﬁscal position of country A, Et(Bt).6 The expected default probability
increases strictly with the expected ﬁscal position
∂Pe
t
∂Et(Bt) > 0. For the formation
of the expectation of the actual ﬁscal position, the investor makes use of two in-
formation sources. The ﬁrst is the oﬃcial publication of the ﬁscal position, which
we call the ’oﬃcial signal’, and the second is a signal coming from news agencies
observing the ﬁscal behavior of governments, which we call the ’news signal’. The
oﬃcial signal is given by:
B
O
t = Bt − c − ηt (7)
where c is the average amount of creative accounting, ηt is normally and indepen-
dently distributed with mean zero and variance σ2
ηt. The oﬃcial ﬁscal position BO
t
is thus equal to the actual position Bt, a systematic creative accounting bias c and
an error term. We think of the diﬀerence between the actual ﬁscal position and the
oﬃcial one as creative accounting (Bt − BO
t = CAt = c + ηt). From the point of
view of the investor, creative accounting is thus an unknown random variable with








t = Bt + εt (8)
where εt is again normally and independently distributed with mean zero and vari-
ance σ2














t + c. Thus, the larger e.g. βt relative to αt, the more precise and
less distorted is the information collected by news agencies about Bt, and the more
6Due to the uncertainty concerning the government’s use of creative accounting, the expected
ﬁscal position can diﬀer from the actual ﬁscal position, Bt.
8weight does the investor put on the news signal for forming his believe over Bt.
Rearranging equation (9) leads to:
E(Bt) = ˜ BO
t + xt(B
N




αt+βt denoting the informativeness of the news signal relative to the
informativeness of the oﬃcial signal. We see that the investor’s expectation about
the actual ﬁscal position of the government is equal to the oﬃcially reported one,
˜ BO
t , plus a correction term due to the use of creative accounting, which is weighted
by the relative informativeness of the news signal, xt. Note that the diﬀerence in the
two signals is given by creative accounting and a random term related to the noise
in the news signal, i.e., BN
t − ˜ BO
t = CAt−c+εt. If the informational content of the
second signal converges towards zero (x → 0), the expectation of the actual ﬁscal
position will be equal to the oﬃcial announced ﬁscal position plus average cheating
c.
Fiscal transparency might have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the relative informative-
ness of the news signal. Fiscal transparency has a disciplinary eﬀect on governments
by not only reducing government deﬁcits (see e.g. Alt and Lassen (2006)), but also
the use of creative accounting (compare e.g. Koen and van den Noord (2005)). In
this case, the precision of the oﬃcial signal, αt, depends positively on ﬁscal trans-
parency. However, the more transparent the budgetary process of a country is, the
easier it is for news agencies to detect creative accounting, which increases also the
precision of the news signal, βt. Therefore, depending on which eﬀect is stronger,
ﬁscal transparency can have a positive or a negative eﬀect on the relative informa-
tiveness of the news signal, xt, and therefore on the eﬀect of creative accounting on
the expected default probability.
2.2 An empirical model of the determinants of risk premia





= α1+fiscalitα2+α3CAit+α4·FTit·CAit+α5FTit+α6zit+ i+ǫit (11)
where  i denotes country dummies and ǫit is an error term with usual properties.
The dependent variable is the yield spread between a bond issued in EU country
i and a benchmark country j, both denominated in the same currency. Looking
at spreads between bonds issued in the same currency has the advantage that one
9can neglect the issue of exchange rate risk so that data coming from the pre-EMU
and post-EMU regimes can be analyzed in one data set.7 We regard Germany and
the USA as benchmark countries and the joint currency of issuance is the Deutsche
Mark (Euro after 1999) or the US$, respectively.
The government bond data are taken from Capital Data Bondware, which pro-
vides a data set with information on the yield, maturity, and underlying currency
of government bond issues.8 If available, an equivalent benchmark bond is matched
to the bond issues, between which the yield spread is then calculated.9 We compare
government bonds issued by the 15 EU countries, excluding Luxembourg, between
1991 and beginning 2005 that are denominated in Deutsche Mark (DM) before 1998
and subsequently in Euro or alternatively in US$. Accordingly, the interest diﬀeren-
tial is measured as the diﬀerence in the yield to maturity at the time of issue between
the national bond under consideration and an equivalent German government bond
in the case of DM/Euro denominated bonds or an equivalent US government bond
in the case of a US$ bond. Figure 2 in the appendix plots the yield spreads of
EU government bond issues over time. We see a strong co-movement between the
interest diﬀerentials of EU countries relative to Germany or the USA and a cyclical
pattern.
fiscal includes oﬃcial ﬁscal variables inﬂuencing the ﬁscal position of a coun-
try and thereby the default probability P e. We use the lagged debt to GDP and
deﬁcit to GDP ratios as proxies for the ﬁscal position and its deterioration.10 CA
is a creative accounting measure aimed at capturing the news signal, which should
aﬀect the expected default probability as it deteriorates the expected state of public
ﬁnance. The ﬁscal variables and the creative accounting term are measured as the
diﬀerence relative to the benchmark country Germany and the USA respectively.11
7Favero, Giavazzi, and Spaventa (1997) discuss the relative performance of this measure with
using swap spreads to correct for exchange rate depreciations. They conclude, that both ”proxies
obviously tend to measure the same phenomenon”.
8Thanks to Evi Koch for help with Capital Data Bondware.
9Capital Data Bondware deﬁnes a benchmark bond in the following way. First, it is issued in
the same currency, second, it is issued by the government of the country, which owns the issuing
currency, third, it has the same coupon payment structure, and, ﬁnally, the issuing date is close
that of the comparable bond issue it has a comparable time to maturity.
10While the debt level is a stock variable controlling for the ﬁscal position of a country, the
deﬁcit measures the deterioration of that position.
11More details on CA will be given in the next section. The ﬁscal data are taken from the
AMECO database and are in the deﬁnition of the EDP.
10We expect both, fiscal and CA to positively aﬀect the spread (α2,α3 > 0). FT is
a measure of ﬁscal transparency, which should lower the spread by reducing uncer-
tainty (α5 < 0). The eﬀect of CA on the spread might increase or decrease with
an increase in transparency, the direction depends on how transparency eﬀects xt,
that is the informativeness of the news signal relative to the informativeness of the
public signal. Increased transparency improves the quality of the news signal, but at
the same time reduces the uncertainty about the oﬃcial signal as more transparent
countries probably cheat less. Therefore we expect α4 to be larger (smaller) zero, if
transparency increases (decreases) x.
zit is a vector containing several variables aﬀecting the yield spread of the issuing
country, i.e. a liquidity variable (liquidity), an indicator of the cyclical stance (cycle)
of the economy, a variable measuring the general investors’ risk attitude (corspread),
and a maturity variable (maturity).
The liquidity variable serves to estimate the liquidity premium. We cannot follow
one of the conventional approaches to use bid-ask spreads, which reﬂect trading costs
in trading securities (Flemming 2003) as a measure for liquidity, since this informa-
tion is not reported for primary issues. Gravelle (1999) shows that the correlation
between bid-ask spreads and the total supply of debt is signiﬁcantly negative. This
suggests that the total volume of supply of a security has a positive eﬀect on its
liquidity, an argument put forward also by G´ omez-Puig (2006). Following this rea-
soning, we assume as Bernoth, von Hagen, and Schuknecht (2004) that liquidity
depends on market size and, additionally, that all debt issued by a government
in a given currency is homogeneous up to maturity. Thus, the liquidity premium
is assumed to be proportional to the ratio of the debt issued by a government in
DM/Euro or US$ to the total debt of EU countries issued in DM/Euro or US$.12
Measuring liquidity by the market share of foreign denominated debt assures addi-
tionally a low correlation between our liquidity variable and the debt/GDP variable.
The inclusion of an indicator of the cyclical stance (cycle) is motivated by the
idea that default risk depends on the overall economic situation of a country. In
an economic slow-down, government revenues decrease, while expenditures increase,
and the probability of default may rise. Our indicator takes the value 1, when the
nominal GDP of a country is more than half a standard deviation above its trend
12We also used the issue size as an alternative proxy for liquidity, but since this variable shows
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients, we exclude it from reported regression analysis. The other regression
coeﬃcients remained unaﬀected.
11(boom), (−1) when it is more than half a standard deviation below its trend (reces-
sion), and 0 otherwise. The cycle variable included in the regression is calculated
as the diﬀerence of this indicator between the issuer and the benchmark country.13
As suggested by our model as well by several empirical studies,14 one important
determinant of yield spread between countries is the general investors’ risk aversion
towards credit risk. Since investors’ risk aversion is not directly observable, we use,
similar to Codogno, Favero, and Missale (2003) Favero and Giavazzi (2004), and
Bernoth, von Hagen, and Schuknecht (2004)), the yield spread between low grade
US corporate bonds (BBB) and benchmark US government bonds as an empirical
proxy. A rise in this spread indicates an increase in the investors’ risk aversion, and
vice versa.
We expect, that an investor demands a compensation for investing in long-term
bonds instead of buying short-term bonds as the default risk increases with time
to maturity. Given that our data set contains bond issues with diﬀerent times
to maturity, this motivates the inclusion of a maturity variable to our regression
equation, which measures the time to maturity of the bonds at the time of issue.
Since we have data before and after the introduction of the Euro, we have to
augment the above equation. More precisely, we estimate the following equation:
rit − rjt
1 + rit
= fiscalit( 1 +  2EMU) + CAit(ξ1 + ξ2FTit + ξ3EMU) + β1FTit +
+ zit(α1 + α2EMU) + α3EMU +  i + ǫit (12)
where  i denotes country dummies and ǫit is an error term with usual properties.
To estimate the eﬀects of EMU on yield spreads, we use the EMU dummy which
takes the value of one for all EMU member countries as of 1998 and for Greece as
of 2000 and zero otherwise.15 A signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on this dummy points to a
13Thus, cycle is zero, if both countries are in the same cyclical position; it is (−2) and (2), if one
is in a strong boom and the other in a strong recession, and (−1) and 1 in the case of less severe
diﬀerences in the cyclical stance.
14E.g. Dungey, Martin, and Pagan (2000) provide strong evidence of a common international
factor in many yield diﬀerentials. Codogno, Favero, and Missale (2003) and Pagano and Thadden
(2004) also note considerable co-movement of yield spreads, probably driven by international risk
factors. Bernoth, von Hagen, and Schuknecht (2004)) conﬁrm as well that interest diﬀerentials
between EU countries are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by international risk factors and that the USA
enjoy a ’safe haven’ status.
15We included the year 1998 in the EMU dummy since the decision, which countries would
participate was made public in May of 1998 and was ex hypothesi correctly expected.
12general eﬀect of EMU on yield spreads of all member countries. Furthermore, we
interact the EMU dummy with the ﬁscal variables, and the liquidity variable to see
whether EMU has changed the eﬀect of the ﬁscal variables, creative accounting, and
market liquidity on interest rates.
Before estimating equation (12) we tested, whether we can pool DM/Euro and
US$ bonds into one data set. That means that we test, whether the eﬀects of the
independent variables on the spreads are the same for both currency groups. We ﬁnd
that, except for the eﬀects of corporate-government spreads, pooling is permissable.
Thus, we estimate for the variable corspread for both currency groups separate
slope coeﬃcients. To do that, we add a variable to our regression that interacts the
variable corspread with a dummy that takes the value one, if a bond is issued in
US$.
Finally, we include country dummies to control for unobserved country charac-
teristics. This is especially relevant in the current context, as some countries have
a reputation of frequent ﬁscal misreporting. The coeﬃcients of creative accounting
including countries dummies thus really captures the change of the country’s risk
premium due to the new signal. It does not capture the bad reputation of that
country.
Detailed summary statistics of all mentioned variables are given in Table 3 in
the appendix.
3 Creative accounting and ﬁscal transparency
3.1 Creative accounting
Measuring creative accounting is - by deﬁnition - diﬃcult as it is an unpublished
and hidden ﬁscal activity. Therefore, in our empirical exercise, we have to resort
to approximate measures for the true extent of creative accounting. We employ
two diﬀerent measures, both measures only approximate the true extent of creative
accounting. Both measures come from generally available information sources and
therefore represent ”news” signals to the ﬁnancial markets. The ﬁrst one is a noisy
measure of creative accounting, namely stock-ﬂow adjustments in percent of GDP.
Following von Hagen and Wolﬀ (2006), they are calculated from equation (13) as
the diﬀerence between the change in the debt level B and the deﬁcit D.
Bt − Bt−1 − Dt = SFAt (13)
13The advantage of this measure is that it captures all events that have an eﬀect
on the debt level without being recorded in the budget. This advantage is also
the measure’s main weakness, as some operations might not reﬂect the attempt to
improve the books but result from purely technical problems that do not necessarily
have an eﬀect on the default probability of a country.16 Overall, these ”noisy”
parts of the measure are probably random and should tend to cancel out over time
(European Comission, DG for Economic and Financial Aﬀairs 2003, p.79). von
Hagen and Wolﬀ (2006), however, show that stock-ﬂow adjustments observed in
Europe are on average positive over long periods of time. They also show that
SFA is actively used by governments as a creative accounting tool. Buti, Martins,
and Turrini (2006) extend and conﬁrm these results. This creative accounting part
contained in SFA should have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on interest rates, if it is recognized
by ﬁnancial markets as increasing the risk of default.
As a second measure of creative accounting, we employ the data presented in
Koen and van den Noord (2005), who collect individual one-oﬀ measures to window
dress the budget. The measure, called ’ﬁscal gimmickry’, is a non-exhaustive in-
ventory of events that have become public knowledge through media coverage. It is
a more ”ﬁne tuned” measure of creative government activities than SFA. However,
it is very likely, that many of such operations are unnoticed by news agencies and
are therefore not collected in this database. Thus, while SFA probably captures a
broader range of creative accounting but is measured with noise because of ”non-
creative” parts of SFA, ’ﬁscal gimmickry’ is a ’pure’ measure of creative accounting
but captures only the window-dressing activities that became public knowledge and
have been collected in the data base.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between stock-ﬂow adjustments and one-oﬀ mea-
sures as collected by Koen and van den Noord (2005). We can clearly see a positive
relationship, suggesting that the two measures probably both give similar and valu-
able information of creative accounting.
Summary statistic of our two creative accounting variables are shown in Table 3
in the appendix.
16For example, positive SFA resulting from exchange rate re-valuation of foreign denominated
debt are connected with a change in the ability of governments to service the debt, while positive
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Figure 1: The relation between stock-ﬂow adjustments and ﬁscal gimmickry taken
from Koen and Noord (2005) in percent of GDP, when gimmickry is observed.
3.2 Fiscal transparency
Fiscal transparency is an important concept, which is, however, diﬃcult to mea-
sure. The IMF’s concept of ﬁscal transparency is deﬁned in their manual on ﬁscal
transparency.17 This deﬁnition, which emphasizes being open to the public about
the structure and functions of government, ﬁscal policy intentions, public sector
accounts, and ﬁscal projections is based on Kopits and Craig (1998).18
In our paper, we think of transparency in a more narrow sense as inﬂuencing
the relative information content of the oﬃcial deﬁcit signal and further creative
accounting news. This narrower concept is also used to deﬁne transparency by
Poterba and von Hagen (1999, pp. 3-4): ”A transparent budget process is one that
provides clear information on all aspects of government ﬁscal policy. Budgets that
17http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/manual/intro.htm
18The IMF code includes four general principles of ﬁscal transparency. The ﬁrst general principle,
Clarity of Roles and Responsibilities, is concerned with specifying the structure and functions of
government, responsibilities within government, and relations between government and the rest
of the economy. The second general principle, Public Availability of Information, emphasizes
the importance of publishing comprehensive ﬁscal information at clearly speciﬁed times. The
third general principle, Open Budget Preparation, Execution, and Reporting, covers the type
of information that is made available about the budget process. The fourth general principle,
Assurances of Integrity, deals with the quality of ﬁscal data and the need for independent scrutiny
of ﬁscal information.
15include numerous special accounts and that fail to consolidate all ﬁscal activity into
a single ’bottom line’ measure are not transparent. Budgets that are easily available
to the public and to participants in the policymaking process, and that do present
consolidated information, are transparent.”
We capture the concept of informational transparency with two measures. One
is a newly developed index of auditing, called Audit. This index is calculated on the
basis of the answers collected by an OECD and World bank survey conducted in
2003. A detailed description of the derivation of this index is given in the Appendix.
Audit measures whether governments are ﬁnancially audited externally, how inde-
pendent the auditing can be performed and how well the obtained information is
disseminated.
The other index used is based on a part of the indicator developed in the seminal
paper by von Hagen (1992), extended in Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2001)
and updated in Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2005). We call this indicator
Transparency, it is a measure of informativeness and transparency of the budget draft
and includes an assessment of transparency given by government oﬃcials, the degree
to which special funds are included in the budget draft, the information whether
the budget consists of one document, whether it is linked to national accounts and
ﬁnally whether government loans are included.
In comparison to Audit, Transparency is up-dated twice over the investigated
time period, and therefore also takes the development of ’budgetary transparency’
over time into account. Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2005) show that there
has been a general increase in the level of transparency in Europe over the covered
time period. Figure 3 in the Appendix compares the two measures of ﬁscal trans-
parency for the year 2003. As can be seen, both are positively correlated. Table 3 in
the appendix describes the descriptive statistics of these two transparency variables.
For both measures of ﬁscal transparency, we expect a negative impact on default
risk premia asked by ﬁnancial markets. Thus, the better governments are audited
and the better the public information on the budget, the lower the spread. The
hypothesis underlying this prediction is that ﬁnancial markets know about trans-
parency and will penalize in-transparent institutions, as they have less information
on the true state of public ﬁnance. Furthermore, more transparency might increase
the bargaining power of lenders in case of debt restructuring and thereby lower the
risk of losing out completely on a credit.
Figures 4 and 5 in the appendix suggest that there exists a negative relation-
16ship between ﬁscal transparency and creative accounting. Thus, a country with
a highly transparent budgetary process uses less ﬁscal window-dressing activities
than a less transparent country. A logit regression between a binary variable, that
takes the value of 1 if a country used ﬁscal gimmickry and zero otherwise, and
the Transparency index conﬁrms this result. However, the causality between these
two variables is unclear. It might be that lower scores on ﬁscal transparency raise
the odds of gimmickry, because the probability of detection is small. Alternatively,
countries that have less incentive/need to hide parts of their ﬁscal position might
introduce a highly transparent budgetary process to signal their trustworthiness to
ﬁnancial markets.
Figures 6 and 7 in the appendix plot the relation between the variance of publicly
known creative accounting and the level of ﬁscal transparency. These graphs con-
ﬁrm the prediction, that transparency and the uncertainty of (measured) creative
accounting are negatively correlated.
A simple correlation analysis between spreads and the two measures of creative
accounting provides ﬁrst evidence, that there exist a signiﬁcant positive relationship
between interest rates and hidden ﬁscal policy. For stock-ﬂow adjustments this
positive correlation is signiﬁcant at a 5 percent level, while for gimmickry it is




Table 1 presents our estimation results. All regressions are estimated with country
ﬁxed eﬀects to control for unobserved country characteristics.19 Our results conﬁrm
the previous results of Bernoth, von Hagen, and Schuknecht (2004). Deﬁcits signif-
icantly increase risk premia.20 According to column A, a deﬁcit diﬀerential of ﬁve
percent relative to the benchmark country explains a yield diﬀerential of around 20
19We also estimated regression (12) without country ﬁxed eﬀects to exploit as well the cross-
country dimension of our data. The estimation results are qualitatively similar and are available
from the authors on request.
20Only in two regressions deﬁcits become insigniﬁcant since their eﬀect can not be separated
from the eﬀect of ﬁscal transparency.
17basis points. However, the signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient on deficit ∗ EMU indi-
cates that with EMU the eﬀect of deﬁcits on risk premia is signiﬁcantly reduced. In
fact, an F-test on the sum of the coeﬃcients for deficit and deficit ∗ EMU does
not allow to reject the null hypothesis of no inﬂuence of the deﬁcit on the spread
with an EMU membership.
Before 1999 and for non-EMU countries thereafter, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and
positive eﬀect of ﬁscal gimmickry on government bond yields. The coeﬃcient for
stock-ﬂow adjustments shows as well the expected positive sign, but is signiﬁcant
at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level in only 3 out of 5 regressions. A reasonable ex-
planation for the weak signiﬁcance of stock-ﬂow adjustments is that this measure of
creative accounting is, as described earlier, a noisy measure for creative accounting.
All in all, we can summarize that ﬁnancial markets recognize window-dressing of
governments and are not completely fooled. Financial markets thus demand higher
interest rates if a government uses creative accounting.
Interestingly, the eﬀects of the two diﬀerent CA measures and the eﬀects of the
deﬁcit, are quantitatively substantially diﬀerent. While an increase in stock-ﬂow
adjustments by one percent of GDP increases the spreads by less than one basis
point (and is not always signiﬁcant), the eﬀect of an equivalent increase in gimmickry
amounts to up to 20 basis points. Increasing the deﬁcit by one percentage point
will lead to an increase of the spread by roughly three basis points. The diﬀerence
in coeﬃcient size needs to be explained. In fact, if all three variables were perfect
measures of the factual deterioration of the ﬁscal stance of the economy, they should
all equally aﬀect the probability of default. The estimated coeﬃcients should be the
same as they measure the increase in the spread due to the equally increased default
probability.
The diﬀerence in coeﬃcient sizes can result from two sources. First, sfa is a very
rough measure of creative accounting. It is well known, that if a variable is measured
with error, the coeﬃcient is biased towards zero (the so called attenuation bias). If
sfa measures the actual deterioration of the ﬁscal position with more noise than
the deﬁcit, and if the noise is well-behaved, the diﬀerence in size of the coeﬃcient
vis-a-vis the deﬁcit coeﬃcient might actually result from this attenuation bias. The
estimated coeﬃcient for sfa is thus a lower bound for the true impact of creative
accounting on spreads.
However, the argument that the attenuation bias also explains the discrepancy
between the coeﬃcients of sfa and gimmickry, does not seem to be plausible. sfa must
18be extremely noisy to actually explain the huge diﬀerence in these two coeﬃcients.
Therefore, we believe that the large size of the ﬁscal gimmickry coeﬃcient must
result from something else. The data on which ”gimmickry” is based come from
creative accounting events that become public knowledge in the media. Apparently,
ﬁnancial markets react more strongly to these events than to more hidden creative
accounting, which we capture with sfa. Figure 1 indicates why the reaction to sfa
should be smaller than to gimmickry. As can be seen, gimmickry increases less than
one-to-one compared to sfa. This implies that the coeﬃcient of sfa should be lower
than the one of gimmickry. Probably, ﬁnancial markets assume that the gimmickry
becoming public knowledge is just the tip of the iceberg. In this interpretation,
gimmickry data represent a huge signal of additional hidden ﬁscal proﬂigacy, which
is penalized accordingly by ﬁnancial markets.
After acceptance to EMU, the eﬀect of cheating on the risk premium is sig-
niﬁcantly reduced, as indicated by the negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on
sfa ∗ EMU and gimmickry ∗ EMU. Comparable to the weakening of the deﬁcit
eﬀect, an F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis of no signiﬁcant relationship be-
tween stock-ﬂow adjustments and interest rate spreads after the start of EMU. Once
inside the Euro, ﬁnancial markets thus basically become indiﬀerent to the cheating
of individual EMU members.21
We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between the lagged debt level and the
yield spread. This suggests that ﬁnancial markets mostly react to the deterioration
of the ﬁscal position and not to its overall level. A reasonable explanation is that
the inﬂuence of the relatively time-invariant debt level on interest spreads is almost
entirely absorbed in the estimated country-ﬁxed eﬀects.
Before EMU and for non-EMU countries after 1999, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant liquidity
eﬀect on interest rate spreads in most regressions. According to column A, an
increase of the relative debt market size by ﬁve percent causes a reduction of the
yield spread by around four basis points. As indicated by the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
on Liquidity ∗ EMU, EMU-membership reduces the liquidity premium contained
in government bond yields. A F-test does not reject the hypothesis that liquidity
premia even vanish with EMU. An explanation is that this results from the improved
integration of markets, which lowers transaction costs. This result is in line with
Pagano and Thadden (2004), who also conclude that liquidity premia play a smaller
21Anecdotal evidence from signiﬁcant deﬁcit and debt data revisions in some countries in recent
years conﬁrms this ﬁnding as risk premia moved very little in these cases.
19role in explaining yield diﬀerentials after EMU membership.
As indicated by the signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of corspread ∗ US, we ﬁnd for yield
diﬀerentials relative to the USA a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the general investors’ risk
aversion. The more risk averse investors are towards credit risk, which is indicated
by a large spread between low-graded US corporate bonds and US government bonds,
the wider is the interest diﬀerential between an EU country and the USA. For bond
yield spreads relative to Germany, we do not ﬁnd this eﬀect. This shows that,
contrarily to Germany, the USA enjoy a ’safe haven’ status and that international
factors have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on government bond yield spreads, which is in line
with the results of e.g. Codogno et al. (2003), Gomez-Puig (2005) and Bernoth
et al (2004). The other control variables have the expected signs and will not be
discussed further at this place.
Columns B and D extend the regression by two alternative measures for ﬁscal
transparency. In all regression with gimmickry, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant reduction of the
spread, the more transparent the budgetary process of a government is. An increase
of the audit as well the transparency measure taken from Hallerberg, Strauch, and
von Hagen (2005) by one standard deviation causes an decrease of the yield dif-
ferential by roughly 6 basis points.22 For both transparency measures, we ﬁnd the
statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients on creative accounting to remain unaﬀected.
This shows, that the signiﬁcant results of creative accounting do not result from an
omitted variable bias because of missing transparency proxies. Overall, our evidence
suggest that ﬁscally more transparent countries have to pay lower risk premia. This
evidence conﬁrms the prediction by Kopits and Craig (1998) that ﬁnancial markets
can be more certain about a ﬁscally transparent government’s ability and willingness
to service its obligation and therefore demand lower risk premia.
In Columns C and E, we presents the estimation results for gimmickry and sfa
interacted with our two measures for ﬁscal transparency. We ﬁnd a strong and sig-
niﬁcant negative eﬀect for gimmickry interacted with Audit and Transparency. This
indicates that ﬁnancial markets are less worried about gimmickry of a transparent
country. This probably means that gimmickry is not perceived as a very bad sig-
nal of the tip of the iceberg if the budgetary process of a government is relatively
transparent. In terms of the model interpretation, improved auditing respectively
transparency has a stronger eﬀect on the reliability of the oﬃcial signal as compared
22Note, that we cannot control for country dummies in this regression, since Audit is time
invariant.
20to the precision of the news signal. Fiscal transparency thus probably reduces the
odds of creative accounting strongly.
Our results provide evidence, that ﬁnancial markets care about creative account-
ing. Creative accounting results in higher risk premia. Since creative accounting
measured by gimmickry is signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations with included country
dummies, ﬁnancial markets appear to value the de facto deterioration of the inter-
temporal budget situation. This indicates, that ﬁnancial markets do not only take
creative accounting exclusively as a signal of the country’s general characteristics.
They rather evaluate the actual deterioration of the ﬁscal position of the country
resulting from creative accounting.
The diﬀerent size of the coeﬃcient for gimmickry and sfa provides some evidence,
that public knowledge of this creative accounting plays a crucial role for ﬁnancial
markets. Recall that the gimmickry data are based on cases of ﬁscal cheating that
made it in the news. These bad ”cheating-news” strongly degrade the perception
of risk of a country. Financial markets’ risk assessment is, however, less aﬀected by
gimmickry, the more transparent a country is.
21Table 1: Creative accounting, ﬁscal transpareny and risk premia in government bond markets
A B C D E A B C D E
deﬁcit 3.98 3.66 3.69 4.18 4.14 deﬁcit 2.58 1.09 0.64 2.01 2.08
3.15 2.04 2.06 3.41 3.72 3.41 1.11 0.73 2.59 2.9
sfa 0.50 0.48 0.96 0.47 0.56 gimmickry 17.20 20.50 43.98 22.53 20.51
1.74 1.65 0.84 1.67 1.43 3.96 4.39 6.05 4.94 5.08
debt(-1) 0.18 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.07 debt(-1) -0.06 0.02 0.07 -0.05 -0.04
1.14 0.67 0.58 0.79 0.9 -0.46 0.15 0.52 -0.66 -0.55
liquidity -0.88 -0.92 -0.99 -0.59 -0.60 liquidity -0.49 -0.49 -0.35 -0.24 -0.19
-2.32 -2.44 -2.26 -1.57 -1.61 -1.85 -1.8 -1.42 -0.99 -0.86
corspread 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 corspread 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03
0.96 0.92 0.84 1.15 1.17 -0.02 0.89 0.79 0.6 0.74
US -40.40 -40.63 -41.70 -47.61 -47.15 US -54.42 -45.75 -43.45 -56.08 -52.12
-3.68 -3.5 -3.42 -5.33 -5.28 -5.27 -4.31 -4.07 -6.32 -5.89
corspread*US 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.40 corspread*US 0.47 0.42 0.41 0.44 0.42
6.5 6.29 6.07 8.26 8.26 8.16 7.28 7.11 8.96 8.65
cycle -3.30 -3.40 -3.54 -3.76 -3.85 cycle -1.00 -0.75 -0.82 -1.13 -1.04
-2.67 -2.76 -2.84 -3.09 -3.28 -0.78 -0.57 -0.65 -0.77 -0.71
maturity 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.79 0.80 maturity 1.18 1.18 1.20 1.07 1.07
2.78 2.61 2.6 2.71 2.73 3.65 3.61 3.74 3.82 3.88
EMU -13.28 -12.80 -13.02 -9.45 -9.17 EMU 2.34 -0.07 -0.81 3.12 2.40
-2.18 -2.13 -2.14 -1.62 -1.68 0.5 -0.02 -0.18 0.71 0.55
deﬁcit*EMU -4.49 -4.09 -4.20 -3.81 -3.90 deﬁcit*EMU -1.89 -0.14 0.49 -1.28 -1.28
-3.05 -2.09 -2.07 -2.82 -2.75 -2.07 -0.11 0.45 -1.45 -1.5
sfa*EMU -1.35 -1.36 -1.34 -0.68 -0.80 gimmickry*EMU -24.28 -27.61 -27.70 -26.69 -26.14
-2.43 -2.46 -2.43 -1.35 -1.29 -5.66 -5.98 -6.92 -5.91 -6.48
debt(-1)*EMU -0.13 -0.18 -0.17 -0.11 -0.13 debt(-1)*EMU 0.16 0.16 0.26 0.14 0.09
-0.86 -1.11 -1.1 -0.98 -1.08 1.36 1.41 2.07 1.43 0.87
liquidity*EMU 1.03 1.14 1.17 0.66 0.66 liquidity*EMU 0.35 0.55 0.50 0.03 0.12
2.29 2.7 2.65 1.63 1.67 1.16 1.76 1.69 0.09 0.41
transparency -14.89 -17.38 transparency -41.08 -29.85
-0.73 -0.91 -2.52 -1.73
transparency*SFA -0.72 transparency*gimmickry -37.78
-0.46 -2.75
audit -37.95 -35.53 audit -41.36 -19.54
-3.26 -2.9 -3.61 -1.29
audit*SFA -1.13 audit*gimmickry -16.81
-0.45 -2.33
cons 12.19 25.78 29.42 18.45 17.10 cons -22.30 3.98 -4.87 13.05 8.64
1.37 1.17 1.42 2.33 2.21 -1.47 0.2 -0.24 1.73 1.11
country dummies yes yes yes no no yes yes yes no no
N 235 234 234 234 234 N 208 208 208 207 207
r2 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.60 0.60 r2 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.71 0.71
Notes: t-values below the coeﬃcient.
2
24.2 Robustness checks
Table 2 shows IV regressions to address the potential attenuation bias resulting from
the imprecise measurement of creative accounting through stock-ﬂow adjustments.
If the coeﬃcient is downward biased because of the attenuation bias, we expect
the coeﬃcients on sfa to be larger in the instrumental variables regressions. We
instrument sfa with ﬁscal gimmickry and ﬁnd the expected result. The coeﬃcient
for sfa is now larger and closer to the one on ﬁscal gimmickry.
Table 2: Instrumental variables regressions for stock-ﬂow adjustments
sfa 11.97 7.91 1.40 1.83
2.21 0.43 1.17 1.67
sfa*EMU -10.54 -13.99 4.92 -0.31
-1.91 -0.97 1.52 -0.07
deﬁcit 5.48 5.83 4.41 4.50
1.84 0.73 2.83 2.65
debt(-1) 0.61 1.59 0.08 0.21
1.53 0.37 0.72 0.82
liquidity3 0.68 0.38 -0.53 -0.88
0.42 0.17 -1.06 -1.73
corspread 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.01
0.17 0.1 1.13 0.21
US -27.88 -8.47 -23.94 -38.94
-0.79 -0.04 -1.58 -2.85
corspread*US 0.34 0.34 0.27 0.40
2 0.39 2.93 4.84
cycle -21.06 -15.20 -0.62 -3.17
-1.8 -0.56 -0.19 -1.4
maturity 1.30 2.33 0.84 1.21
1.67 1.29 2.05 2.93
EMU -4.12 12.88 -12.27 -8.10
-0.23 0.36 -1.37 -1.06
deﬁcit*EMU -3.79 -16.36 3.86 -2.53
-0.99 -1.61 1.13 -0.46
debt(-1) EMU -0.60 -0.17 -0.05 -0.06
-1.26 -0.31 -0.27 -0.26
liquidity3*EMU -0.36 -0.07 0.21 0.62
-0.23 -0.02 0.39 1.09
cons 1.23 -36.89 9.74 33.02
0.04 -0.1 0.83 1.12





N 208 208 225 225
Notes: t-values below the coeﬃcient.
Our estimates might suﬀer from endogeneity if governments use creative account-
ing to ”fool” the ﬁnancial markets. In this case, the estimated coeﬃcients will be
23biased, as they are driven by reverse causality. In this view, governments engage in
creative accounting when the spreads are larger in order to reduce the risk premium
and the connected interest payments. While it is very likely that other factors, es-
pecially ﬁscal rules and electoral motives, determine the incentives of governments
more than the relatively small spreads in the EU, we want to make sure that our
coeﬃcients are not driven by a possible reverse causality problem. Therefore, we
perform a second sets of instrumental variable regressions in Table 2.
In the second set of IV regressions, we instrument sfa with political economy
variables. It is reasonable to assume, that variables measuring political and espe-
cially institutional features of an economy are exogenous to the interest rate spread.
They are, however, very likely to be connected to the amount of creative account-
ing. In particular, we employ the transparency measure Transparency, a dummy
variable taking the value 1 in election years, a variable measuring the quality of the
budget process and a variable for the raw ideological distance (vetoman) within a
government.23 Following Hallerberg (2004), we expect better budgeting institutions
to contribute to lower use of sfa, while governments might be particularly tempted
to use sfa in election years. Finally, we expect that the larger the ideological distance
in a government, the more diﬃcult it will be to agree on hiding parts of the budget
from the books. The ﬁrst stage regressions conﬁrm these predictions. As Table 2
shows, the instrumented sfa has the expected eﬀect on the spread and is statistically
signiﬁcant when controlling for country dummies. We are therefore conﬁdent, that
our measured coeﬃcients on creative accounting are not driven by reverse causality.
5 Conclusions
We develop a portfolio model of interest diﬀerentials based on Bernoth, von Hagen,
and Schuknecht (2004). In this model, interest rate diﬀerentials increase with a
relative worsening of the ﬁscal position. The model is augmented to account for
ﬁscal creative accounting and ﬁscal transparency. Creative accounting appearing
in the media constitutes a news signal. The more reliable this signal, the greater
will be the eﬀect of creative accounting on the expected ﬁscal position of a country.
Creative accounting news should therefore increase the default risk premium. Fiscal
23Thanks to Mark Hallerberg for providing us with the data on raw ideological distance. Raw
ideological distance is measured according to the Manifesto Project, which codes the distance
among parties based on their election manifestos in multiple dimensions.
24transparency should reduce spreads through lowering of uncertainty of ﬁscal policy.
In addition, it inﬂuences the relative information content of the oﬃcial and the news
signal as more transparent countries probably provide more reliable oﬃcial data.
The empirical results conﬁrm the hypotheses derived from the model. Creative
accounting increases risk premia. The gimmickry events, that make it in the ﬁnan-
cial news, have strong punishing eﬀects on risk premia. This is especially true, if
a country is in-transparent, as ﬁnancial markets then take gimmickry as a ”tip of
the iceberg” signal. Creative accounting thus increases the cost of borrowing signiﬁ-
cantly, if it becomes known, especially if ﬁnancial markets are unsure about the true
extent of creative accounting. Deﬁcits and creative accounting are penalized less
in EMU. This suggests that central banks should increase their eﬀort to monitor
ﬁscal policy and to publicly stress the importance of sound ﬁscal policies. Fiscal
transparency is connected with lower risk premia in our estimations. Instrumen-
tal variable regressions conﬁrm the results by addressing potential simultaneity and
attenuation biases.
The results highlight the importance of ﬁscal transparency for the credibility of
governments. More transparent governments beneﬁt from a signiﬁcantly lower risk
premium. Moreover, our results show that ﬁnancial markets penalize ﬁscal misre-
porting heavily, which suggests that they are not fooled. In the monetary union,
ﬁnancial markets care less about hidden as well as oﬃcial ﬁscal policy, however.
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Figure 2: Interest rate spreads for central government primary debt issues vs bench-
mark countries Germany or USA in basis points.
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Figure 5: Fiscal gimmickry as a function of Audit.
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Figure 6: The variance of gimmickry as a function of transparency.
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Figure 7: The variance of stock-ﬂow adjustments as a function of transparency.
31Table 3: Descriptive statistics and sources of the variables.
327 A new index of ﬁscal transparency
Fiscal transparency is an important concept, which is diﬃcult to measure. In this
paper, we focus on the narrow concept of ”information” transparency. Our index
”Audit” captures the degree to which ﬁscal book keeping is being audited and the
extent to which the information of this auditing becomes public knowledge. A
further aspect of Audit relates to potential political pressure that results from the
auditing results.
Audit is based on a OECD/World Bank survey of budget practice, which was
launched in February 2003, in more than 60 countries.24 In the survey, question
are asked regarding (1) general information on government budget organization, (2)
budget formulation, (3) budget execution, (4) accounting, control and monitoring
systems, (5) budget documentation and performance management, (6) ﬁscal rela-
tions among levels of government, and (7) special relationships and issues.
We took the responses on question in the area (4), more speciﬁcally 4.5a-4.5t.
The questions and our coding are listed below. To each question, we assigned a
value between zero and four, where four indicates the response most conducive to
ﬁscal ”transparency”. The index is computed as the simple sum of the responses to
all individual questions. We also computed the average response for every country.
This alternative index, however, appears to capture the true extent of auditing less
adequately, as non-response is not counted. Especially Greece leaves a signiﬁcant
amount of questions unanswered. We believe, that it is reasonable to assume that
partial non-response is a sign of very bad auditing quality.
24The results are available at http://ocde.dyndns.org/
33Table 4: The external audit index

















Notes: Authors’ calculation based on World Bank/OECD survey.
Question: Coding of the answers devel-
oped by the authors.
Are government entities subject to
ﬁnancial audits by an external au-
ditor?
yes=4, no=0
Is there a central Supreme or Na-
tional Audit Oﬃce
Yes, reports to legislative
branch=4, Yes, reports to the
executive branch=2, Yes, reports
to judiciary branch=1; Other,
please specify=0
Can the external auditor contract
out to other entities?
Yes to private ﬁrms=4; Yes to
other independent government
bodies=2.5; Yes, other please
specify=1, No=0
Is the National Audit Oﬃce peer
reviewed by other countrys audit
oﬃces?
Yes, it is a routine practice=4, Yes,
on an ad hoc basis=2, No=0
34How would external audit arrange-
ments be described?
There is no formal external audit
of government accounts=0; The au-
dit authority reports only within
the executive (e.g., to the Presi-
dent)=1; A National Audit Body,
independent of the executive, au-
dits government accounts and re-
ports to the executive=2; The Na-
tional Audit Body is a legislative
body=3; A National Audit Body,
independent of the executive, au-
dits government accounts and re-
ports to the legislature=4
How is the independence of the Na-
tional Audit Body from the execu-
tive established?
It is established in the constitu-
tion=4; It is established in law=3;
It is set out in administrative reg-
ulation=1; It is not clearly set out
in law=0
What mandate does the National
Audit Body have?
0 to 4(most functions)
Are the ﬁndings of the National
Audit Body available to the pub-
lic?
Always=4; Generally, but with
some exceptions (e.g., audits of the
military)=2; Never or rarely=0
Does the external auditor conduct
performance audits?
Yes=4, No=0
Is there a materiality level or other
risk management procedure that
limits the number of governmental
organisations or entities subject to
audit?
yes=0, no=4
35Are audit results circulated and
discussed in Parliament?
no=0, No, the reports are too
late=1; Yes, by Budget commit-
tee=2; Yes, by oversight commit-
tee(s)=3; Yes, by General Assem-
bly=4
How are the subjects of audits de-
termined?
By legislative branch request=4;
By request from the public or other
civil society actor=3; Internally de-
termined=2; By executive branch
request=1; Other, please specify=0
Is there a system to track audit rec-
ommendations once issued?
Yes, keeps track of implementation
of recommendations=4; Yes, an an-
nual report is issued of recommen-
dations=3; Yes, but the reports are
kept internally=1;No=0
Is the executive branch required by
constitution or legislation to follow
up and respond to national audit
body recommendations?
yes=4; Yes, but there is a proce-
dure by which the executive may
reject the recommendation=3; No,
but it generally does=1; No=0
Does the Supreme Audit body co-
ordinate with or use the reports of
internal auditors?
all yes=4. No=0
Does the legislature have an audit
body that is not aﬃliated with the
National Audit Body?
yes=4, no=0
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